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We model the robustness against random failure or intentional attack of networks with arbitrary
large-scale structure. We construct a block-based model which incorporates — in a general fashion
— both connectivity and interdependence links, as well as arbitrary degree distributions and block
correlations. By optimizing the percolation properties of this general class of networks, we identify
a simple core-periphery structure as the topology most robust against random failure. In such
networks, a distinct and small “core” of nodes with higher degree is responsible for most of the
connectivity, functioning as a central “backbone” of the system. This centralized topology remains
the optimal structure when other constraints are imposed, such as a given fraction of interdependence
links and fixed degree distributions. This distinguishes simple centralized topologies as the most
likely to emerge, when robustness against failure is the dominant evolutionary force.
One of the most important characteristics of large net-
worked systems is their capacity to function reliably. Per-
haps the simplest paradigm employed in the study of
robustness of network systems is the theory of percola-
tion [1], which describes the conditions for the formation
of a system-spanning connected component. Arguably, if
a system is not connected to begin with, it is unlikely to
function properly, regardless of its intended purpose. Re-
cently [2], it has been shown that if the interdependence
of the many elements is taken into account, the random
failure of a fraction of the system can cause a catastrophic
outcome, where the relative size of the connected cluster
falls discontinuously to zero, which otherwise would have
been a continuous transition, in the absence of interde-
pendence.
In this Letter, we investigate analytically and numer-
ically the most fundamental large-scale structures [3]
which results in robustness against random failure and
malicious attack. By constructing a general block-based
model, and analytically deriving its percolation proper-
ties, we obtain the topological configuration which opti-
mizes a well-defined robustness criterion. In the case of
random failure, we find that a remarkably simple core-
periphery (CP) topology [4, 5] emerges as the most op-
timal, when no other constraints are imposed other than
the overall cost in realizing the system. This topology
remains optimal when one introduces interdependence
links, and it can entirely suppress the catastrophic failure
present in fully random topologies. However, in the case
of targeted attacks, the fully random configuration turns
out to be the most robust. We also consider the scenario
where degree constraints are present, and find that the
bimodal core-periphery structure is replaced by strongly
dissortative and assortative block topologies, for random
and targeted attacks, respectively.
Here we consider a stochastic blockmodel [6, 7], which
defines an ensemble of networks composed of B discrete
node blocks, where nr is the number of nodes in block
r and ers is the number of edges between blocks r and
s (or twice that number if r = s). Each block is al-
lowed its own degree distribution, prk. We also consider
interdependence edges by defining a distinct matrix eˆrs
and degree distributions pr
kˆ
, in an analogous fashion. As
in [2], if a node u is dependent of another node v, u fails
automatically when v fails, and vice-versa. In the case of
multiple dependencies [8], all support nodes must fail in
order for the dependent node to fail (i.e. they are redun-
dant). Assuming that the values of nr are large enough,
this ensemble becomes locally tree-like [9], thus it is pos-
sible to adapt the epidemics-based generating function
formalism [10–12], which becomes exact in the limit of
large networks. If we define ur as the probability that a
node belonging to block r is not in a macroscopic com-
ponent via one of its neighbors, the dilution variable φrk
as the fraction of nodes belonging to block r and with
degree k which are not removed from the network, and
additionally the interdependence dilution φˆr defined as
the fraction of nodes from block r which were not re-
moved due to the failure of the support nodes, we can
write the following self-consistency equations (see Sup-
plemental Material for a derivation),
ur =
∑
s
mrs
[
1− φˆsfs1 (1) + φˆsfs1 (us)
]
(1)
φˆr = 1− fˆr0 (1−
∑
smˆrsS
0
s ) + fˆ
r
0 (0), (2)
where mrs = ers/nrκr is the asymmetric matrix defin-
ing the fraction of edges adjacent to vertices of block r
which are also adjacent to block s, where κr =
∑
s ers/nr
is the average degree of block r. Sr = φˆrS0r is the frac-
tion of nodes of block r which belong to a macroscopic
component, and S0r = fr0 (1) − fr0 (ur), given as a func-
tion of the diluted degree generating function fr0 (z) =∑
k p
r
kφ
r
kz
k. Furthermore, fr1 (z) =
∑
k qkφ
r
k+1z
k gen-
erates the diluted excess degree distribution of block r,
with qrk = p
r
k+1(k + 1)/κr. Note that we have f
r
1 (z) =
fr ′0(z)/g
r ′
0(1) where gr0 =
∑
k p
r
kz
k generates the undi-
luted degree distribution of block r. The generating func-
tion fˆr0 (z) =
∑
kˆ p
r
kˆ
zkˆ describes the degrees correspond-
ing to interdependent edges alone. The total fraction of
nodes which belong to a macroscopic component is sim-
ply S =
∑
r wrSr, where wr = nr/N is the fraction of
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FIG. 1. (a) Block structure with 10 blocks of equal size. Each
node represents a block, and black (red) edges correspond to
connectivity (interdependence) edges. Squares (circles) have
exponentially (Poisson) distributed connectivity degrees with
κi = 2.25 (κi = 1.75), and κˆi = 8 (κˆi = 6). All interdepen-
dence degrees are exponentially distributed. (b) The matrices
ers (black squares) and eˆrs (red squares) that correspond to
this ensemble. (c) S a function of φ, for random failures. The
solid lines are results obtained via Eqs. 1 and 2, and the filled
symbols are obtained empirically with a network realization
of size N = 106. The two discontinuous jumps, correspond to
the outer and inner rings failing in sequence.
nodes belonging to block r, and the total dilution in the
network is likewise φ =
∑
r,k wrp
r
kφ
r
k [13].
Although quite straightforward, this parametrization
is a generalization of many scenarios considered in
the literature, such as two fully interdependent net-
works [2], the “network of networks” topology [14–16],
single networks with mixed connectivity and interdepen-
dence edges [17–19], as well as networks with only con-
nectivity edges and arbitrary degree distribution and cor-
relations [20], all of which correspond to specific choices
of the parameters defined here. In Fig. 1 is shown an
example of a block structure with both support and in-
terdependence links, as described in the legend. It also
shows a comparison with the empirical percolation pro-
file of networks realized from this ensemble, which is in
excellent agreement with the theoretical prediction.
We are interested in obtaining the block topologies for
which the robustness against failure or attack are opti-
mal. Following [21] we will consider the total robustness
of a network ensemble to be given by
R = 2
∫ 1
0
S(φ)dφ, (3)
where the factor 2 is chosen so that R ∈ [0, 1], with
R = 1 being possible only in the hypothetical scenario
S(φ) = φ, attainable only for infinitely dense networks.
Thus our ultimate task is to find the parametrization of
the blockmodel ensemble which maximizes Eq. 3, under
suitable constraints. In the following, we focus on the
special case with uniform failure of nodes within a sin-
gle block, φrk ≡ φr; hence fr0 (z) = φrgr0(z). The total
dilution becomes simply φ =
∑
r wrφr. [Without loss of
generality, since heterogeneous degree-based dilution can
still be achieved if nodes of different degrees belong im-
plicitly to different blocks.] In the case of random failure
we have simply, φr = φ. In the case of targeted attacks
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FIG. 2. (Color online) (a) S as a function of φ, for random
failures, different β values, 〈k〉 = 2 and ˆ〈k〉 = 0. The solid
lines are results obtained via Eqs. 1 and 2, and the filled
symbols are obtained empirically with a network realization of
size N = 106. The dashed curve close to φ = 1 corresponds to
targeted attacks for β →∞; (b) Correlation matrix ers/eres
(top), block sizes wr and average degrees κr, for different β
values; (c) Ensemble samples with 〈k〉 = 2 and N = 103 nodes
for different β values. The orange (square) nodes belong to
the core block.
we will use φr ∝ eκr(1−b)/b, where b ∈ [0, 1] must be so
chosen to achieve a desired total φ.
Instead of directly finding the network topology
parametrization which maximizes R, we proceed by ob-
taining the configuration which delivers a specified value
of R, and is otherwise maximally random. We do so in
order to identify network structures with a varied de-
gree of robustness, and to isolate the most fundamen-
tal characteristic responsible for its increase. Hence, we
consider a null model of robust networks, where superflu-
ous characteristics are explicitly discarded. More specifi-
cally, we maximize the entropy of network ensemble [22],
subject to the constraint that the average robustness is
fixed [23]. This amounts to finding the critical points of
the Lagrangian Λ = Σ − β˜(R − R∗), where Σ = ln Ω
is the microcanonical entropy (with Ω being the number
of different network realizations for a specific ensemble
parametrization), R and R∗ are the actual and desired
average robustness respectively, and β˜ is a Lagrange mul-
tiplier. Instead of fixing R∗, one may fix β˜, and this
becomes equivalent to minimizing the free energy of the
ensemble,
F = −NR− Σ/β, (4)
since Λ = β˜(F/N + R∗), and β ≡ −β˜/N . In Eq. 4, the
value −NR plays the role of average energy, and β is
the inverse temperature, which can also be interpreted
as a “selective pressure” [24], since for β = 0 the en-
tropy is strictly maximized (i.e. all networks occur with
3equal probability), and conversely for β → ∞ the av-
erage robustness is strictly maximized. In our case we
have Σ = S + Sˆ, where S is the stochastic blockmodel
entropy [25],
S = −
∑
r
nr
∑
k
prk(ln p
r
k + ln k!)−
1
2
∑
rs
ers ln
(
ers
eres
)
,
(5)
which includes the entropy of the degree distributions of
the individual blocks, and Sˆ is equivalently defined as a
function of eˆrs and prkˆ [26].
Solving the system given by Eqs. 1 and 2 cannot be
performed analytically, and thus the same holds for ob-
taining R and F . Hence we must resort to solving Eqs. 1
and 2 numerically (by simple iteration), in order to ob-
tain Eqs. 3 and 4. The minimization of Eq. 4 can then
be performed within arbitrary precision with any suit-
able minimization algorithm (see Supplemental Material
for details).
The ensemble can have additional constraints, which
must be imposed when minimizing F . One such con-
straint we will consider throughout this paper is that the
average degree 〈k〉 will be fixed at a given value, which
represents the putative cost of adding extra edges to the
network, compared to simply replacing them. Further-
more, in order to restrict the number of degrees of free-
dom of the model to a manageable size, we will assume
that all blocks have the same type of degree distribution,
which can be different only in their average value, κr.
This does not alter very strongly the type of networks
which are ultimately attainable, since in principle one
can construct many different topologies by composing a
larger number of such blocks. We will also forbid nodes
with degree zero, since these never belong to a macro-
scopic component. The degree distribution we use is a
modified Poisson distribution prk = (1 − δk,0)κkr/(eκr −
1)k! [identical to a regular Poisson, but with support
k ≥ 1], which is generated by gr0(z) = ze(κr−1)(z−1),
which of course implies that κr ≥ 1 for all r. The
same distribution will also be used for the interdepen-
dence degrees, pr
kˆ
. Note that this simplifies the entropy
to S = ∑r nr ln(eκr − 1) − 12∑rs ers ln(ers/nrns), and
equivalently for Sˆ. Finally, the total number of blocks B
will also remain fixed during the minimization of F .
In absence of any further constraints, we start with the
case of random failures, and no interdependence links
(κˆr = 0). We observe that increasing β leads from a
fully random graph (β = 0) to a topology which can be
significantly more robust (see Fig. 2a). For B = 2 blocks,
this topology is a core-periphery (CP) structure [4, 5],
where one block is much smaller and has a much larger
average degree, κr, and attracts a large portion of the
edges. One might expect this to be a special case when
one imposes B = 2, and that different robust topologies
may arise for B > 2. However, this turns out not to
be the case, and we find exactly the same CP topology
for any value of B larger than two, in the sense that
two or more blocks may be merged together, with the
ensemble remaining equivalent, until only B = 2 blocks
are left. In Fig. 2b are shown two resulting ensembles
for different β and with B = 3, for 〈k〉 = 2. The size
and average degree of the core block become smaller and
larger, respectively, for larger values of β. Examples of
how such networks can look like are shown in Fig. 2c.
For sufficiently large β, the vast majority of periphery
nodes are connected exclusively to core nodes, which are
much smaller in number (infinitesimally so for β → ∞),
and which are connected among themselves, forming a
central backbone [27].
Observing how the value of R changes with β exposes
a structural phase transition at a critical value of β = β∗,
below which the networks are fully random (ers ∝ eres
and κr = 〈k〉), and above which the CP topology is ob-
served (see Fig 3a). The value of β∗ becomes smaller for
〈k〉 close to two, and larger for either sparser or denser
graphs. The CP topology is particularly advantageous
for sparse graphs, with lower 〈k〉, but is less so for denser
graphs, as can be seen in Fig. 3a, which shows a compar-
ison between the β = 0 (random) and β = ∞ (optimal)
cases, as a function of 〈k〉.
When node interdependence is enforced (κˆr ≥ 1 [28]),
the same CP structure emerges for larger values of β,
as shown in Fig. 4b. For β → ∞, the percolation tran-
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FIG. 3. (Color online) (a) Robustness R (Eq. 3) as a function
of β for different average degrees 〈k〉, with ˆ〈k〉 = 0; (b, c)
Robustness difference between optimal ensembles (β → ∞)
and random networks (β = 0) with the same 〈k〉, for (b)
ˆ〈k〉 = 0 and (c) ˆ〈k〉 ≥ 1.
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FIG. 4. (Color online) (a) Same as Fig. 2a, with 〈k〉 = 4, ˆ〈k〉 =
1.1.; (b) Same as Fig. 2b, and the same constraints as in (a).
The correlation matrix eˆrs/eˆr eˆs and average interdependence
degrees κˆr are shown in red; (c) Same as Fig. 2a, with 〈k〉 = 2,
ˆ〈k〉 = 1.1 and N = 104. The red edges are interdependence
links.
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FIG. 5. (Color online) (a, b) Same as Fig. 2a for (a) random
failures and (b) targeted attacks. In both cases the values wr
and κr are kept fixed. (c, d) Ensemble samples with N =
104 nodes, β → ∞, for (c) random failures and (d) targeted
attacks.
sition changes from abrupt to continuous (see Fig. 4a).
The average interdependence degrees, κˆr, become corre-
lated with the connectivity degrees, κr, with most inter-
dependence edges lying between two core nodes, which
therefore benefit more from the extra redundancy, to the
indirect benefit of the periphery nodes as well. In com-
parison to the ˆ〈k〉 = 0 case, denser networks benefit more
from the CP topology, since it removes the abrupt phase
transition. The benefit diminishes for larger ˆ〈k〉, since
the larger redundancy already provides an inherent ro-
bustness to random networks. A special case is ˆ〈k〉 = 1,
which shows a lower improvement, because it strictly for-
bids intra-core redundancy.
As seen in Figs. 2a and 4a, the CP topology is ex-
cellent against random failure, but is extremely fragile
against targeted attacks, in which the core nodes are re-
moved before the rest (the value of S vanishes for an
infinitesimal value of 1 − φ). Instead, if one optimizes
R against targeted attacks, one obtains that the random
block topology is the most robust. The only exceptions
are very sparse networks with 〈k〉 . 2 (see Fig. 3b). Since
these networks are close or below the percolation thresh-
old even for φ = 1, the CP topology is still an improve-
ment over the fully random case, even if gets destroyed
very quickly by a targeted attack.
In some realistic situations there are degree constraints
restricting the accessible topologies [21]. Here we intro-
duce this by forcing that the blocks have prescribed sizes
and average degrees (see Supplemental material for de-
tails). As can be seen in Fig. 5a, in the case of random
failure, the optimal topology approaches the CP config-
uration as much as the imposed constraints allow, and
the inter-block connectivity becomes strongly dissorta-
tive, with the nodes with largest degrees serving as inter-
mediaries between the nodes with the lowest degrees and
an innermost “core” composed of more of such alternat-
ing layers. For targeted attacks the resulting topology
is quite different: The blocks with higher κr are “ex-
pelled” from the network, since they are the first to be
removed in an attack. The resulting topology is highly
assortative, with blocks with similar κr connecting pref-
erentially to themselves. This is qualitatively equivalent
to the “onionlike” topology found empirically in [21]. An
exception to this are the blocks with small κr. These do
form a CP structure, since an assortative connectivity
would have very weak percolation properties even when
no nodes are removed, i.e. φ = 1 (similarly to the case
〈k〉 . 2 discussed previously). Very similar results are
obtained when interdependence is introduced (see Sup-
plemental material).
The topologies described above arise when no con-
straint other than those considered is being imposed,
and the ensemble entropy is maximized. This is not of-
ten the case for real systems, since they may be subject
to competing selective pressures, with robustness being
only one of them, as well as other topological restrictions,
frozen accidents, etc. Nevertheless, the analysis pre-
sented here suggests that a simple core-periphery struc-
ture is the most natural configuration which achieves
robustness against random failure (and that a random,
non-centralized topology works best against targeted at-
tacks). Therefore, it not a surprise that a CP topol-
ogy is indeed found to some extent in many real sys-
tems [4], such as the Internet [29], and gene regulation
networks [24]. Also, our results indicate that other fea-
tures found in real systems, such as scale-free degree dis-
tributions, are not a strict necessity for robustness, and
do not arise naturally for this purpose, and thus may
be simply a byproduct of a non-equilibrium organization
process.
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Supplemental Material: Evolution of robust network topologies
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GENERATING FUNCTION PERCOLATION
FORMALISM
Following [1–3], we derive self-consistency equations
for the percolation properties of stochastic blockmodel
ensembles as follows. If we let ur describe the probabil-
ity that a node belonging to block r is not in a macro-
scopic component via one of its neighbors, the dilution
variable φrk as the fraction of nodes belonging to block r
and with degree k which are not removed from the net-
work, and additionally the interdependence dilution φˆr
defined as the fraction of nodes from block r which were
not removed due to the failure of the support nodes, we
can write,
ur =
∑
s
mrs
∑
k
(1− φˆsφsk+1 + φˆsφsk+1uks)qsk, (1)
where mrs = ers/nrκr is the asymmetric matrix defining
the fraction of edges adjacent to vertices of block r which
are also adjacent to block s, and qrk = p
r
k+1(k + 1)/κr
is the excess degree distribution of block r, and κr =∑
s ers/nr is the average degree of block r. This can be
rewritten in compact form as
ur =
∑
s
mrs
[
1− φˆsfs1 (1) + φˆsfs1 (us)
]
, (2)
where fr1 (z) =
∑
k qkφ
r
k+1z
k is the generating func-
tion of the excess degree distribution. Note that we
have fr1 (z) = fr
′
0(z)/g
r ′
0(1) where gr0 =
∑
k p
r
kz
k and
fr0 (z) =
∑
k p
r
kφ
r
kz
k are the generating functions of the
original and diluted degree distributions, respectively.
The fraction of nodes of block r which belong to a macro-
scopic component is given by Sr = φˆrS0r , where S0r =
fr0 (1)− fr0 (ur). The total fraction of nodes which belong
to a macroscopic component is simply S =
∑
r wrSr,
where wr = nr/N is the fraction of nodes belonging to
block r, and the total dilution in the network is likewise
φ =
∑
r,k wrp
r
kφ
r
k.
In the case of no interdependence edges, we have sim-
ply φˆs = 1, and Eq. 2 describes Sr completely. Oth-
erwise, an additional fraction of nodes will be removed
from the macroscopic components, if the nodes to which
they depend do not belong to the component. The frac-
tion φˆr of nodes which are not removed in this way can
be obtained by
φˆr =
∑
kˆ
pr
kˆ
[
1− (1−∑smˆrsS0s )kˆ]+ pr0, (3)
where kˆ are the interdependence degrees, and pr
kˆ
is the
interdependence degree distribution of block r. Here it is
assumed that the interdependence is undirected (if node
u is dependent on v, then v is also dependent on u), and
that at least one dependency must not fail in order for
the dependent node not to fail (i.e. redundant interde-
pendence), and furthermore that a node with kˆ = 0 is
autonomous (see below for variations of these rules). We
may write this equation in a more compact form as,
φˆr = 1− fˆr0 (1−
∑
smˆrsS
0
s ) + fˆ
r
0 (0), (4)
where fˆr0 (z) =
∑
kˆ p
r
kˆ
zkˆ is the interdependence degree
generating function. Note that the right hand side of
Eq. 4 depends only on ur variables (via S0r ), and thus
may be included directly into Eq. 2, resulting in a to-
tal of only B equations. Similarly to [3], here we omit
the detailed description of the failure cascades as done
in e.g. [2], however these correspond simply to repeated
iterations of Eqs. 2 and 4, where one must first obtain the
convergence of the ur variables, and then of the φˆr vari-
ables, in succession. However, if one is only interested in
the steady state, simultaneously iterating Eqs. 2 and 4 is
more straightforward.
One may also consider different interdependence rules
by slightly modifying Eq. 4. For instance, in the case of
non-redundant interdependence, where all dependencies
are essential, so that if any one of them fails, the de-
pendent node fails as well, can be described by replacing
Eq. 4 by
φˆr = fˆ
r
0 (
∑
smˆrsS
0
s ) + fˆ
r
0 (0). (5)
Furthermore, one may also consider the situation where
the interdependence is directed, i.e. if node u depends
on node v, v does not necessarily depend on u (in this
situation it assumed that eˆrs is also directed, and thus
asymmetric, and the variables kˆ describe the dependence
in-degree). This can be implemented by an almost trivial
modification, simply by replacing S0s → Ss in Eq. 4 or 5,
where we have, as before, Sr = φˆrS0r . This is simply
because a node will fail either if it does not belong to a
macroscopic component, or if its dependence neighbors
fail. However, in the case of directed interdependence,
the likelihood that two nodes are mutually interdepen-
dent is vanishingly small, and thus the support node will
depend exclusively on other nodes, which will themselves
not fail with probability given by φˆr. This introduces a
direct coupling between the variables φˆr (which is only
indirect in the undirected case). Although seemingly in-
nocuous, this modification can drastically change the per-
colation properties of the system, in particular when the
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FIG. 1. Robustness R to uniform node removal of random
networks with one block B = 1 , as a function of ˆ〈k〉, and dif-
ferent values of 〈k〉, for (a) undirected interdependence and
(b) directed dependence; (c) Relative size of the largest com-
ponent S as a function of the dilution φ, for a random graph
with 〈k〉 = 5, directed dependencies and different ˆ〈k〉 values.
The solid lines are results obtained via Eqs. 2 and 4 (with
S0s → Ss), and the filled symbols are obtained empirically
with a network realization with N = 106 nodes.
average degrees κˆr are close to one. Indeed if all nodes
have kˆ = 1, the failure of an infinitesimal fraction of
nodes will always cause a global cascade, independently
of how well connected the network is. This is easy to
understand, since the removal of a single node will neces-
sarily cause the failure of another node, which will trig-
ger the failure of a third one, and so on, until a loop is
reached. The average size of these cascades diverges, and
thus the values of Sr will drop to zero. The robustness of
random networks (B=1) with different values of ˆ〈k〉 and
〈k〉 are shown in Fig. 1, for both connectivity and inter-
dependence degree distributions given in the main text
if 〈k〉 ≥ 1 or pk = 〈k〉δk,1 + (1 − 〈k〉)δk,0 if 〈k〉 < 1. For
undirected interdependence, we have that R approaches
one for 〈k〉 → ∞, for all values of ˆ〈k〉. However for di-
rected dependence, we have R dropping to zero as ˆ〈k〉
approaches one, independently of 〈k〉.
In all cases, the percolation threshold can be obtained
by examining the Jacobian J = {∂(u′r|φˆ′r)/∂(us|φˆs)},
where u′r and φˆ′r correspond to the right-hand side of
Eqs. 2 and 4, respectively. If the largest eigenvalue λ
of J at the fixed point ur = 1 and φˆr = fˆr0 (0) exceeds
one, this solution is unstable, and thus some value of Sr
must be finite, and hence the condition λ = 1 marks the
percolation transition.
MINIMIZATION OF THE FREE ENERGY, F
As mentioned in the main text, the computation of R
and thus F must be done numerically, by iterating Eqs. 2
and 4 until convergence within some desired precision is
reached. This means that the minimization of F must
also be performed numerically. We used different algo-
rithms, depending on the set of constraints used. In the
case of ˆ〈k〉 = 0, the L-BFGS-B quasi-Newton method [4],
with gradient obtained with finite differences, delivered
fast and reliable results if the number of degrees of free-
doms were not very large (B = 2 or 3). For larger number
of blocks, the non-gradient COBYLA algorithm [5] per-
formed better. In the case ˆ〈k〉 > 0, the discontinuity in
S(φ) makes the gradient estimation unreliable, and the
COBYLA algorithm is a better choice. In both cases,
when improved precision was necessary, a repeated se-
quential one-dimensional minimization over all variables
using Brent’s method [6] was performed, at the expense of
longer computational time. In the case of very large val-
ues of B, an initial estimation using the ALPSO stochas-
tic swarm-based algorithm [7] was used, which was then
improved upon, whenever possible, with COBYLA.
In all cases, the constrained optimization problem
was transformed into an unconstrained one, via appro-
priate transformations. The normalization constraints,∑
r wr = 1 and
∑
rs ers = N〈k〉 can be imposed simply
by transforming wr = C exp(w˜r), and ers = D exp(e˜rs)
with C−1 =
∑
r wr and D
−1 =
∑
rs ers/N〈k〉, and
solving for w˜r and e˜rs. Note that we can set, e.g.
w˜0 = 0 and e˜00 = 0 so that only 2B + B(B − 1)/2 − 2
free variables remain. The degree constraints κr ≥ 1
can be imposed via the transformations κr = κ˜r if
κmin ≡ min({κr}) ≥ 1 otherwise κr = arκ˜r + 1 where
ar = (κr − 1)/
∑
s ws(κs − κmin). The new row and col-
umn sums of ers given by
∑
s ers =
∑
s esr = Nwrκr
can then be enforced in the ers matrix via a Sinkhorn
scaling [8]. The same transformations can be used for
the eˆrs matrix. With all these transforms in place, the
optimization problem becomes fully unconstrained, with
w˜r, e˜rs and ˜ˆers lying in the interval [−∞,∞]. Note that
the variable N is only included in the text to slightly
simplify the notation, but it is entirely unnecessary dur-
ing the optimization, since one needs to work only with
normalized variables.
In all minimizations performed, the same solutions
were found, regardless of the algorithm used or the initial
configuration. Although the different methods have dif-
ferent precision and convergence speed, the results were
always mutually consistent. Additionally, the indepen-
dence of the results on the initial configuration implies
the results obtained were always a global minimum of the
free energy.
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FIG. 2. (a, c) Fraction S of nodes in the macroscopic com-
ponent as function of the dilution φ, for different β values,
fixed values of wr and κr, and ˆ〈κ〉 = 1.2, for random failures
(a) and targeted attacks (c). The solid lines are results ob-
tained via Eqs. 2 and 4, and the filled symbols are obtained
empirically with a network realization of size N = 106; (b,
d) Correlation matrices ers/eres (black) and eˆrs/eˆr eˆs (red),
block size wr and average degrees κr (black) and κˆr (red), for
β →∞, for random failures (b) and targeted attacks (d).
IMPOSING DEGREE CONSTRAINTS
As mentioned in the main text, in some realistic situ-
ations there are degree constraints restricting the acces-
sible topologies [9]. Here we introduce it by forcing that
the blocks have prescribed sizes and average degrees, fol-
lowing wr ∝ κ−γr and κr = ecr, with r ∈ [0, B − 1] and
c = lnκmax/(B− 1). This allows us to have a very broad
range of degrees, similar to what is found in scale-free
networks. In Fig. 5 of the main text are shown the re-
sults for B = 6, γ = 2 and κmax = 103. Very similar
results are found by varying B, γ and κmax (not shown).
Here we expand briefly on these results by introducing
interdependence, i.e. ˆ〈k〉 ≥ 1. We do so in slightly dif-
ferent way than before, by imposing a separation of the
network into two parts of equal size, such that connec-
tivity (interdependence) edges are only allowed between
nodes in the same (different) part. This is to mimic, e.g.
the situation of computer and electricity infrastructure,
where interdependence is only meaningful between the
two different types of nodes. With this constraint, we
obtain a configuration very similar to the case without
interdependence (see Fig. 2), with dissortative and assor-
tative connectivity for the random and targeted removal,
respectively. However, the interdependence connectiv-
ity is slightly more elaborate: For random failures, the
values of κˆr are correlated with κr, and the eˆrs matrix
displays a more assortative connectivity, with blocks de-
pending on other blocks with similar average degree. In
the case of targeted attacks, the interdependence shows
a CP structure for blocks with low degree, but otherwise
follows the same segregated pattern as the connectivity
edges.
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